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Abstract
The underlying fundaments of blockchain are cryptography and cryptographic concepts
that provide reliable and secure decentralized solutions. Although many recent papers study
the use-cases of blockchain in different industrial areas, such as finance, health care, legal
relations, IoT, information security, and consensus building systems, only few studies scru-
tinize the cryptographic concepts used in blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) that gives a complete picture of the existing
cryptographic concepts which have been deployed or have the potential to be deployed in
blockchain. In this paper, we thoroughly review and systematize all cryptographic concepts
which are already used in blockchain. Additionally, we give a list of cryptographic concepts
which have not yet been applied but have big potentials to improve the current blockchain
solutions. We also include possible instantiations of these cryptographic concepts in the
blockchain domain. Last but not least, we explicitly postulate 21 challenging problems that
cryptographers interested in blockchain can work on.
∗Department of Information Security and Communication Technologies, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology - NTNU
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1 Introduction
Blockchain, a distributed ledger managed by a peer-to-peer network collectively adhering to some
consensus protocol, is arguably considered as a new and disruptive technology. Both academia
and industry are profoundly affected by new solutions to some old problems which are based
on this new technology. The success of the blockchain concept is ultimately connected with
the financial success of Bitcoin [1] that was developed just one decade ago, and the subsequent
avalanche of more than 2140 other crypto-currencies that all together built a financial market
worth around $285 billion (as of 16 June 2019) [2].
We can trace the origins of the ideas to use cryptography for secure and private transactions
for paying access to databases, paying for services such as online games, transferring money
over the Internet, Internet shopping and other commercial activities back in 1990’s with David
Chaum’s eCash system [3]. One of the negative aspects of eCash was that it was a centralized
system, controlled by a trusted third party. Another hurdle for a broader acceptance of eCash
was the fact that it was covered by a long list of patented algorithms – something that is
considered as a big obstacle to acceptance among the crypto community.
In parallel, in 1990’s we saw the development of several cryptographic ideas not directly
connected but somehow still related to the ideas of using cryptography in financial transactions.
We mention some of them such as the proposal on how to combat junk email [4] by Dwork and
Naor that was published in 1992, and which used computationally expensive functions. Then in
1996, there was a proposal for time-lock cryptographic puzzles [5] by Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner
by using RSA based CPU expensive computations. At the end of 90’s and early 2000’s several
patent free cryptographic concepts were proposed, implemented and released as open source
projects by an online movement and a community of cryptographers and programmers known
as ”Cypherpunks” [6]. Those cryptographic concepts and implementations include Adam Back’s
”hashcash” proposal for a currency based on the hardness of finding partial hash collisions [7],
Wei Dai’s ”b-money” [8] and Nick Szabo’s1 ”Bitgold” proposal [9]. These concepts have been
the basis of the Satoshi Nakamoto’s decentralized cryptocurrency, nowadays known as Bitcoin
[1, 10]. As a recognition of their pioneering activities in the decentralized cryptocurrencies,
Ethereum [11] – the second most popular cryptocurrency – named the three of its denominations
as ”Wei”, ”Szabo” and ”Finney” [12].2
The underlying core technology in Bitcoin is blockchain. Blockchain is a distributed ledger
maintaining a continuously growing list of data records that are confirmed by all of the partici-
pating nodes. The data is recorded in this public ledger in a form of blocks of valid transactions,
and this public ledger is shared and available to all nodes.
Blockchain is envisioned as a promising and powerful technology but it still encounters many
research challenges. Some of the main challenges are constant improvement of its security and
privacy, key management, scalability, analysis of new attacks, smart contract management, and
incremental introduction of new cryptographic features in existing blockchains. These challenges
arise due to the network structure and the underlying consensus mechanisms and cryptographic
schemes used within the blockchains. To overcome these challenges and to find enhanced so-
lutions, many of the cryptographic concepts such as signature schemes, zero-knowledge proofs,
and commitment protocols are scrutinized and applied. As cryptography is a vast research field,
1Nick Szabo was also part of the eCash development team in late 90’s.
2Hal Finney was a cypherpunk and the receiver of the first Bitcoin transaction of 10 Bitcoins from the anony-
mous Satoshi Nakamoto [13].
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there is always a scope to find new cryptographic schemes in order to improve the solutions in
blockchain.
The majority of the ongoing research in Blockchain focuses on finding and identifying improve-
ments to the current processes and routines, mostly in industries that rely on intermediaries,
including banking, finance, real estate, insurance, legal system procedures, and healthcare. The
study on business innovation through blockchain [14] presents some blockchain enabled busi-
ness applications and their instantiations. These blockchain enabled applications still need a
proper way for selecting the cryptographic technique employed in their respective solution in
order to meet the business requirements. Not only these blockchain applications but also the
research community will benefit from an overview in a form of systematization of the current
state of knowledge of all available cryptographic concepts which have been applied or can be
applied in existing and future blockchain solutions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first systematization of knowledge that gives a complete picture of the existing cryptographic
concepts related to blockchain. We have tried to depict most of the cryptographic concepts in
the blockchain domain. Although there are various works about specific cryptographic concepts
used in blockchain, there are only few works which merge all these atomic works and present
them in a single paper. Most of the review and survey works such as [15, 16] discuss security,
privacy, consensus or other challenges in blockchain. A recent work of Wang et al. [17] gives a
comprehensive analysis of cryptographic primitives in blockchain. Their analysis presents the
functionality and the usage of these primitives in blockchain. However, the analysis is based
only on existing cryptocurrencies and it lacks many of the cryptographic protocols which are
used in blockchain.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this study, we classify cryptographic concepts based on their use in blockchain. We have
divided them into two categories: 1. Concepts which are well used in blockchain, and 2. Concepts
which are promising but not yet implemented in blockchain. This categorization does not have
a clear boundary. We classify some cryptographic concepts as promising ones, and that requires
further research and scrutiny in order to be deployed in blockchain. As a result, the following
points are the main contributions of our Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper:
• We provide a description of cryptographic concepts which have been applied in the blockchain
field. We also include instantiation of these concepts in blockchain.
• We provide a list of cryptographic concepts which are rarely used or have not been used
in blockchain but they have the potential to be applied in this field. These concepts
open many possible research directions and they can be examined in different blockchain
applications.
• We identified 21 research challenges that we formulate as Research Problem. Some of them
are rephrased research challenges already published in the literature and some of them are
newly formulated research problems.
In this study, we do not claim that we have exhausted all of the cryptographic concepts
which are employed in blockchain, but we have tried to cover the concepts which we felt are
propitious for the blockchain domain. We also describe each cryptographic concept along with
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its associated properties and its instantiation in the blockchain field. Additionally, in order to
give one unified presentation about blockchain, we give a brief explanation about:
• Enabling concepts of blockchain such as hash function, consensus protocol, network archi-
tecture.
• Layered architecture of blockchain and emphasis on some of the major challenges associated
with blockchain.
2 Research Methodology
To perform a systematization of knowledge of the existing cryptographic concepts related to
blockchain, we established and followed a methodology that we explain in this Section. Since
the invention of Bitcoin, there has been a growing interest in blockchain from both academia
and industry. The number of publications in the blockchain field has been rapidly increasing
in recent years. Not all of these publications are research works; some of these works discuss
different use-cases of blockchain. Therefore, to review these many papers in the blockchain field,
we pursued a research methodology which defines the inclusion criteria, a search strategy to
search for respective publications and a data collection mechanism to accumulate the relevant
publications. The collected data is later processed based on inclusion and exclusion criteria. The
publications which meet the inclusion criteria go through one final step of quality assessment.
Once a publication passes the quality assessment, it is included in our systematization.
We use keyword search to make the first selection of potentially relevant scientific publica-
tions. For the keyword search, we typed keywords such as  cryptographic concept name 
in blockchain  or  use of  cryptographic concept name  in blockchain . We use
Google Scholar as our primary source to search for the relevant literature, but as Google Scholar
does not exhaust all of the available literature, we also searched in databases such as: 1) IACR
eprint archive, 2) IEEE Xplore, 3) ACM Digital Library, 4) ScienceDirect, and 5) Springer Link.
The inclusion criteria for this study is based on the following questions:
• Is the elaborated cryptographic concept useful in blockchain? The usefulness of the crypto-
graphic concept is measured as whether we achieve some essential properties in blockchain
by using the concept or whether the cryptographic concept can be beneficial for some
use-case compared to an already implemented concept.
• Which properties can be achieved by using the cryptographic concept in blockchain?
• Is there any instantiation of the cryptographic concept in a blockchain study or application?
If not, is there any potential?
The criteria for excluding a paper is:
• Informal literature discussing some cryptographic concepts in blockchain.
• Literature which claims on using a cryptographic concept but it does not give any guar-
antees about the feasibility and prospects of a potential implementation.
The quality of the papers that meet the inclusion criteria is assessed. For quality assessment,
we apply the following questions:
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• Is the cryptographic concept implemented in blockchain? If not, is it possible to implement
it and will it be more efficient than the existing solution?
• Is there any security analysis or does the implemented concept rely on another underlying
platform?
• Are the fundamental concept and its related properties adequately described?
3 Supporting and enabling concepts of Blockchain
As previously mentioned, blockchain is a way to encapsulate transactions in the form of blocks
where blocks are linked through the cryptographic hash, hence forming a chain of blocks. Fig-
ure 1 shows the basic blockchain structure. Each block in the blockchain contains a block header
and a representation of the transaction. For instance, in Figure 1, each block consists of its hash,
the hash of the previous block, a timestamp and some other block fields (e.g., version, nonce).
This depends from the block design. Merkle root hash represents the set of transactions in
the Merkle tree, and this representation of transactions varies according to the design of the
blockchain implementation. Figure 2 depicts the Bitcoin blockchain data structure showing in
details the block format.
hHash n
Hash n-1
Timestamp
Merkle Root 
Hash
Block n Block n+2Block n+1
…
.
hHash n
Hash n-1
Timestamp
Merkle Root 
Hash
…
.
hHash n
Hash n-1
Timestamp
Merkle Root 
Hash
…
.
Figure 1: Basic blockchain structure.
Blockchain relies on different constituents which serve different purposes. In this Section,
we give an overview of the main underlying concepts used to build a blockchain. A detailed
technical explanation of all these concepts is out of the scope of this paper, but we have tried
to cover the essentials of their functionality.
3.1 Cryptographic Hash Function
A hash function H is a function which takes an input of an arbitrary size and maps it to a fixed
size output. Cryptographic hash functions have some additional properties such as: a) collision
resistance - it is hard to find two inputs a and b such that H(a) = H(b); b) preimage resistance
- for a given output y it is hard to find an input a such that H(a) = y; and c) second preimage
resistance - for a given input a and output y = H(a) it is hard to find a second input b such that
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Figure 2: Blockchain data structure with block format.
H(b) = y. Readers interested in an extensive cover of the field of cryptographic hash functions
are referred to [18].
Cryptographic hash functions in blockchain are used for various purposes such as:
1. solving cryptographic puzzles (the Proof of Work (PoW) in Bitcoin [1]);
2. address generation (for public and private keys);
3. shortening the size of the public addresses;
4. message digests in signatures.
The most popular cryptographic hash functions used in blockchains are SHA-2 [19] (especially
the variant SHA256 - a variant that produces outputs of 256 bits), and some of the well analyzed
hash functions from the NIST SHA-3 competition and standardization that went to the later
stages of that process (final 5 proposals or some of the 14 proposals from the second phase [20]).
Some of the existing blockchain designs such as IOTA constructed their own ”homebrewed”
cryptographic hash function called Curl-P, that was received very critically and negatively by
the crypto community [21,22].
A typical way how cryptographic hash functions are used in blockchain designs is in a form
of a mode of operation, i.e., a combination of several invocations of a same or different hash
functions. For example, in Bitcoin [1], SHA256 is used twice and that construction is called
SHA256d, i.e.,
SHA256d(message) = SHA256(SHA256(message)). (1)
Mining is a process of creating a new block of transactions through solving a cryptographic
puzzle, and the participant who solves the puzzle first is called a miner of the block. If we look
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at the Bitcoin PoW puzzle, we can see that a miner has to find a Nonce (similar to Hashcash
protocol [7] that we discuss in the next subsection) to create the next block in the blockchain.
The puzzle looks like this:
SHA256d(V er||HashPrevBlock|| . . . ||Nonce) ≤ T (2)
where T is 256-bit target value.
Target Value T Fraction of SHA256d outputs ≤ T
0x7 t1t2t3t4 . . . t62t63︸ ︷︷ ︸
63 times
1
2
0x0 t1t2t3t4 . . . t62t63︸ ︷︷ ︸
63 times
1
16
0x 00 . . . 00︸ ︷︷ ︸
16 times
t1t2t3t4 . . . t47t48︸ ︷︷ ︸
48 times
1
264
Table 1: Fraction of SHA256d outputs with respective target value.
Looking into the fraction of SHA256d outputs that are less than the target value T for
different values of T in Table 1 helps us to understand why mining is hard in PoW. Namely, the
probability of finding a nonce that will cause the whole block to have a hash that is less than
the target value is
Pr[SHA256d(Block) ≤ T ] ≈ T
2256
. (3)
We next discuss the research and innovative activities in the area of cryptographic hash func-
tions that were either remotely or directly connected and inspired by the trends in blockchain.
Several years after the launch of the Bitcoin and its source code being published as an open
source on Github, blockchain designers started to clone and fork its basic code, and started to
introduce different variants and innovations. One of the earliest forks from 2011 that is still
popular nowadays is Litecoin [23]. The basic idea by the Litecoin design was to use a different
hash function for its proof of work puzzles. The motivation came from the fact that even in
2011 there were trends to build specialized application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) hard-
ware implementations of SHA256d that will mine the blocks several orders of magnitude faster
than ordinary CPUs and GPUs. Instead of SHA256d, Litecoin uses Scrypt [24] - a memory-
intensive compilation of use of the HMAC [25] construction instantiated with SHA256 and use
of the stream cipher Salsa20/8 [26]. The idea was that the use of Scrypt will be impractical to
implement it in ASIC, thus, giving chances of individual owners of regular computers and GPUs
to become a significant mining community. While with no doubts we can say that Litecoin is a
very successful alternative cryptocurrency, we can for sure claim that its initial goal to be ASIC
resistant blockchain design was not successful. Nowadays, you can find commercial products for
Litecoin hardware mining3.
3One such a product that can compute 580 billion Scrypt hashes per second, is offered by the company
Bitmain and is called ”Antminer L3++”. As of the time of writing this article, this product was advertised at
https://shop.bitmain.com/ for a price of $213.00 and for a 10 days delivery (2 June 2019).
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Actually, we can say that the 10 years of history of blockchain, in general, and cryptocur-
rencies, in particular, is a history of failed attempts to construct a sustainable blockchain that
will prevent the appearance of profitable ASIC miners that can mine the blocks with hash com-
puting rates that are several orders of magnitude higher than the ordinary users of CPUs and
GPUs. In that short history, we can mention Ethash used in Ethereum [11] for which there are
now commercially available ASIC miners by at least two companies. In 2013, QuarkCoin [27]
introduced the idea of using a chain of six hash functions (five SHA-3 finalists BLAKE, Grøstl,
JH, Keccak and Skein [28]) and the second round hash function Blue Midnight Wish [29]. One
of the motivations behind the QuarkCoin PoW function was to be more ASIC resistant than
SHA256d. The cascading idea of QuarkCoin was later extended to a cascade of eleven hash func-
tions in Darkcoin (later renamed DASH [30]). Needless to say, nowadays there are commercially
available ASIC miners for X11 as well.
The frictions between ASIC miners and the cryptocurrency community seem to remain to the
present days, and are somewhat evolving and inspiring novel proposals in blockchain protocols.
The latest is the Programmatic Proof-of-Work (ProgPoW) initiative for Ethereum blockchain
ecosystem that aims to make ASIC mining less efficient and to give some advantages to graphics
processing units (GPU) mining [31].
3.2 Consensus Mechanisms
Consensus is the key component of blockchain to synchronize or update the ledger by reaching an
agreement among the participants. In order to maintain the ledger in a decentralized way, many
consensus mechanisms have been proposed. The first introduction of the use of a consensus
mechanism in blockchain is implicitly given by Bitcoin. Bitcoin uses Proof of Work (PoW)
mechanism as consensus where the idea came from Hashcash Protocol [7]. The objective of
Hashcash was to prevent spam in public databases. The Hashcash Protocol is as follows. Suppose
an email client wants to send an email to an email server. In the beginning, the client and the
server both agree on a cryptographic hash function H which maps an input string to an n length
output string. Then, the email server sends a challenge string c to the client. Now the client has
to find a string x such that H (c||x ) starts with k zeros. Since H has pseudorandom outputs,
the probability of success in a single trial is
2n−k
2n
= 1
2k
.
Here x corresponding to c is considered as PoW and the process of finding that x is called
mining. PoW is difficult to generate but easy to verify.
Many literature studies on consensus mechanisms, for instance, the survey by Wang et al.
[16] and ”SoK: Consensus in the age of blockchains” [32], have been carried out in the past few
years. Since consensus mechanisms have already been thoroughly studied in the literature, in this
paper, we present the basic idea about how consensus mechanisms work and their classification.
In a consensus protocol, depending on the network architecture and blockchain type, some
or all of the participants take part and maintain the ledger by adding a block consisting of
transactions to their ledger. However, the creation of a new block to be added to the ledger is
performed by a participant who is known as a leader of the consensus protocol in that particular
execution. This leader is elected by different mechanisms of leader election process, and some
of these mechanisms are given in Table 2.
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Leader Election Criteria Reference Protocols
PoW Puzzle Competition
Bitcoin-NG [33], Casper [34],
Proof of Stake velocity [35]
Verifiable Random Function
Tendermint [36], Algorand [37],
Secure Proof of Stake [38]
Trusted Random Function
Proof of luck [39],
Proof of elapsed time [40]
Modified Preimage Search Snow White [41]
Sub-network of
Masternodes / Validator nodes
Darkcoin and DASH [42], Libra [43]
Table 2: Leader election in consensus protocols.
After the leader is elected and the new block is created in order to achieve consensus or
agreement on this block, two types of voting mechanisms are followed: explicit and implicit.
In explicit voting, multiple rounds of voting occur and then based on the votes, consensus is
reached. However, in implicit voting, the new block created by the leader is accepted by others
who implicitly vote for the new block and add it to their ledgers. A leader election through
PoW puzzle competition (e.g., PoW puzzle 2 in Bitcoin) followed by an implicit voting to reach
an agreement is also called ”Nakamoto Consensus”.
Consensus mechanisms also determine the performance of the blockchain network in terms
of consensus finality, throughput, scalability, and robustness against various attacks. In some
manner, consensus orchestrates the state of the programs executed in the blockchain network
nodes by providing a runtime environment to collectively verify the same program and hence
reach to a finality. There is no exact classification of consensus mechanisms, but in general
they can be classified as consensus protocols with proof of concept and consensus protocols
with byzantine fault-tolerant replication. These consensus protocols can be chosen based on
the blockchain network and type. Most of the proof of concept consensus protocols are used in
permissionless blockchains. There are many proof of concept schemes which have been proposed
and implemented, e.g., Proof of Work (PoW) [44], Proof of Stake (PoS) [45], Equihash [46],
having Masternodes in Dash [42], etc. As described in Section 3.1, in PoW puzzle based con-
sensus protocols, miners try to solve the cryptographic puzzle by mining and these miners are
also responsible for verification of the transactions, and an incentive (reward) is given to the
first miner who solves the puzzle.
In case of a permissionless network, as there is no authentication and no proper synchroniza-
tion, the underlying consensus algorithm should be able to handle the synchronization problem,
scale well and mitigate different attacks in order to maintain canonical blockchain state in P2P
network. To solve this synchronization issue, most of the blockchains use ”Longest chain rule”
to have a consistent canonical state of blockchain in this P2P blockchain network. On the con-
trary, in the permissioned blockchain, as there are restrictions and privileges associated with the
peers, there is a strict control on the synchronization among the peers. Byzantine fault-tolerant
protocols are usually adopted in permissioned blockchains to provide consensus properties such
as validity, agreement, and termination. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) [47], Proof
of Elapsed Time [40], Ripple consensus [48] are some of the consensus protocols used in per-
missioned blockchains. Recently, Facebook launched his own global cryptocurrency ‘Libra’ [43]
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New Transactions are broadcast to all nodes
A leader is elected through a leader election
mechanism (e.g. Puzzle Competition)
Leader creates a block of all new transactions 
and broadcast it
Based on multiple rounds of explicit or implicit 
voting, a consensus is reached on the block 
Nodes add this new block to their blockchain
Figure 3: Blockchain consensus scenario.
which works as a permissioned blockchain and provides users to do transactions with nearly
zero fee. Libra blockchain comes with a new programming language ‘Move’ and new consensus
protocol ‘LibraBFT’.
Mining, Pool Mining and Incentive Mechanisms
In Proof of Work based blockchains, the addition of new transactions in the blockchain is per-
formed by the mining process. In the Bitcoin mining process, a puzzle is solved by computing
many hashes repeatedly (Equation 2) by putting different values for the nonce to satisfy the
condition. When a miner successfully solves the puzzle first among all of the miners, it gets
a monetary incentive for solving the puzzle. Because of this incentive process, all consensus
nodes or miners follow the rules of the blockchain state transition during the puzzle competi-
tion. Mining is a resource-intensive process where the main resources are computational power
and memory. Mining can be performed either by a solo miner or by a group of miners, called
a mining pool, who collectively try to solve the puzzle. Mining pools may operate on different
mining techniques and incentive mechanisms. These incentive mechanisms can vary based on
the used mining technique or the decision of the pool operator. Reference [16] gives a brief idea
about the mining strategy management in blockchain networks, while reference [49] provides a
strategic study of mining through stochastic games. Different incentive mechanisms are proposed
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and tested in blockchains. Reference [50] analyzes Bitcoin pooled mining reward systems, and
a reward system based on information propagation in blockchain network is presented in [51].
3.3 Network Infrastructure
Blockchain is maintained by a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. P2P network is an overlay network
which is built on the top of the Internet. This P2P blockchain network can be modeled as
structured, unstructured or hybrid based on several parameters such as the consensus mechanism
and the type of blockchain. Regardless of the representation of the network, a blockchain network
should quickly disseminate the newly generated block so that the global view of the blockchain
remains consistent. Consequently, a synchronization protocol is needed, but a routing protocol
might or might not be needed. A traditional P2P network uses a routing protocol to route
the information through multihop; however, in many blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin), routing is not
required because a peer can get information through at most one hop, so no routing table is
maintained.
Almost all cryptocurrencies and blockchains such as Bitcoin [1], Ethereum [11], Litecoin [23]
use unstructured P2P network where the idea is to have equal privileges for all of the nodes and
to create an egalitarian network. A P2P network can follow flat or hierarchical organization for
building a random graph among the peers. This graph is not fully connected, but in order to
receive all of the communication and to maintain the ledger, each peer maintains a list of peer
addresses. Thus, if any peer propagates a message in the network, eventually all peers receive
it through their available connections. In an unstructured network, techniques like flooding and
random walk are used to make new connections with the peers. In the unstructured network,
peers can leave and join at any time. This can be exploited by an adversary that can join and see
the messages floating in the network and can further do source spoofing, reordering or injecting
of messages.
Blockchain can also use structured P2P network where nodes are organized in a specific
topology and thus finding any resource/information becomes easier. In this structured P2P
network, an identifier is assigned to each node to route the messages in a more accessible way.
Each node also maintains a routing table. A structured P2P network maintains a distributed
hash table (DHT) where (key, value) pairs are stored corresponding to the peers which help
in the resource discovery. Ethereum has started the adoption of structured P2P network by
using Kademlia protocol [52]. However, most of the blockchain networks are unstructured, and
moreover, if the blockchain is public where no restriction to join or leave the network is enforced,
then many possible attacks can happen. Thus, the security of blockchain depends heavily on the
network architecture. A propagation delay or a synchronization problem in a P2P network can
affect the consensus protocol of blockchain, leading to a non-consistent global view in blockchain.
In addition to these problems, an adversary can cause several attacks in a P2P network, where
few of the main attacks are as following:
• Netsplit (Eclipse) attack: An adversary monopolizes all of the connections of a node and
splits that node from the entire network. Further, the node cannot participate in consensus
or validation protocol and this causes inconsistency in the network [53].
• Routing attack: A set of participants are isolated from the blockchain network by the
adversary and thus the block propagation is delayed in the network [54].
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• Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDOS) attack: An adversary exhausts the network re-
sources and targets honest nodes so that honest nodes do not get the services or informa-
tion which they are supposed to receive [55,56].
Blockchain Type Application Domain Anonymity Scalability Challenges References
Permissionless Public Decentralized P2P Networks High Low
Privacy,
Scalability
Bitcoin [1], Zerocash [57],
Monero [58]
Permissioned Public Decentralized Organizations High Moderate
Privacy,
Centralization
Ripple [59], EOS [60]
Permissionless Private Intra-Organization Networks Moderate Moderate
Consensus,
Scalability
LTO [61]
Permissioned Private Organizational restricted ledgers Low High
Consensus,
Centralization
Hyperledger fabric [62],
Monax [63], Multichain [64]
Table 3: Blockchain classification.
3.4 Types of Blockchain
Blockchains can be classified depending on the implementation design, administration rules, data
availability, and access privileges. From an academic point of view, they have been classified
as ”public” and ”private”. While from the administrative point of view, they are described
as ”permissioned” and ”permissionless”. Nevertheless, these terms are used interchangeably in
most of the blockchain studies and applications in industries, which is not the correct way to
use these terms. Even though the classification of blockchains is not very clearly specified in
the literature, we can still classify blockchains by coupling public, private, permissioned and
permissionless.
1. Permissionless Public: In this type of blockchain, anyone can join or leave the network
at any time and participate in consensus as well to maintain the ledger. Everyone also
has read and write access to the blockchain. Thus, it provides minimum trust among the
participants, but it still achieves maximum transparency. Most of the cryptocurrencies
and blockchain platforms are permissionless public, e.g., Bitcoin [1], Zerocash [57] and
Monero [65].
2. Permissioned Public: This type of blockchain allows everyone to read the blockchain state
and data, but in order to write the data and take part in consensus, there are permis-
sions/privileges associated with the participants provided by the network administrator
which in a certain way makes the system not fully decentralized. In this type of blockchain
once a participant has some privileges, based on that it can become a validator as well.
Examples for permissioned public blockchain are Ripple [59], EOS [60] and the newest
Libra [43].
3. Permissionless Private: This type of a blockchain allows organizations to collaborate
without the need of sharing information publicly. Being permissionless, allows anyone to
join or leave the blockchain at any time, which is also acknowledged by other nodes as well.
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The smart contracts on these networks also define who is allowed to read the contract and
the related data, not only just who is allowed to perform the actions. Some permissionless
private blockchains use Federated byzantine agreement as a consensus protocol. LTO [61]
network is an example of a permissionless private blockchain which creates ”live contract”
on the network.
4. Permissioned Private: These blockchains are mostly used in organizations where data/
information is stored in the blockchain with permissioned access control by members of the
organization. The membership in the network is provided by the network administrator
or some membership authority. Read and write access to the data is also provided by the
network administrator. Hyperledger fabric [62], Monax [63], Multichain [64] are examples
of permissioned private blockchains.
Table 3 proffers a clear picture of the classification of blockchains with associated advantages,
challenges and application domains. However, in general, permissionless public blockchains are
commonly referred to as public blockchains and permissioned private blockchains are referred
to as fully private blockchains. A combination of permissioned public and permissionless pri-
vate makes ”consortium blockchain” which is also called a federated blockchain. A consortium
blockchain is neither completely public nor completely private, and it makes blockchain as par-
tially decentralized. In consortium blockchain, the consensus is reached by a selected group of
participants. Nowadays most of the organizations have embraced consortium blockchains for
their blockchain enabled solutions.
4 Challenges in Blockchain
Blockchain as an emerging technology comes with many challenges. In order to solve these chal-
lenges, various solutions have been proposed and implemented in the blockchain. The prolifera-
tion of cryptocurrencies across multiple payment systems brings many risks in social, economic
and technical terms. Blockchain encounters many challenges due to network architecture, under-
lying consensus protocol and applied cryptographic primitives. Some of these major challenges
are security and privacy associated with blockchain, scalability of blockchain, and resource con-
sumption (computational power, memory, network bandwidth). An insightful analysis on the
research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies [66] has been pre-
sented in the past and gives a nice overview of scalability, security, privacy and consensus of
cryptocurrencies.
We can summarize our discussion in Section 3.2, in a form of generic research problems
and research challenges in the area of blockchain consensus mechanisms as follows. Construct
a new blockchain consensus mechanism that is better than the existing ones from the following
perspectives:
1. Less energy consumption;
2. More efficient consensus achievements;
3. Better security than the existing consensus mechanisms.
However, further in the paper when we identify a more concrete and focused research chal-
lenge, we formulate it in a form of a Research Problem. For example, from the discussion given
in the 3.1 we can formulate the following:
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Research Problem 1 Construct sustainable blockchain systems that have one of the following
properties:
1. They are provably resistant to give mining advantages to ASIC miners as opposite to GPU
and CPU miners;
2. They are provably resistant to give mining advantages to ASIC and GPU miners as opposite
to CPU miners.
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Data Privacy Anonymity
Smart Contract Encryption MAC –
Data Privacy
Preserving Computation
Identity Privacy
Preserving Computation
Transaction –
Signature Scheme
Access Structure
of Transactions
Zero-Knowledge Proofs,
Mixing Techniques
Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Consensus – Consensus Access Control
Blind or Ring
Signature
Network
Encryption MAC
Protocols e.g. Gossip – IP Anonymity e.g. TOR
Database Access Control Access Control –
Table 4: Layered architecture of blockchain.
If we observe the blockchain as a layered architecture, we can identify the challenges that
occur in each layer. Table 4 shows blockchain as a stack of five layers. These five layers serve
the following purposes:
• Smart contract layer processes contract data and send the result data to the transaction
layer.
• Transaction layer creates the transactions and sends those to consensus layer.
• Consensus layer runs the consensus algorithm and adds the transactions to the block.
• Network layer deals with all P2P communication among blockchain nodes.
• Database layer stores the blockchain data in a respective database used by respective
blockchain platform.
Table 4 gives a glimpse of blockchain layered architecture and also mentions some of the cryp-
tographic techniques to achieve properties like security and privacy. In Table 4, the first column
defines the layers of blockchain, and the first row illustrates the properties which can be accom-
plished in the different layer using different cryptographic techniques. Thus to understand, each
cell corresponds to the deployed cryptographic method to attain the property in the correspond-
ing column in the respective blockchain layer (corresponding row). For example, encryption can
be used to achieve confidentiality in smart contract layer, Message Authentication Code (MAC)
can be used to achieve integrity in the network layer of blockchain. Table 4 names few of the
techniques used in the blockchain but there are more available cryptographic techniques which
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can be employed in blockchain. “–” in Table 4 represents that the corresponding property
for the corresponding layer does not make much sense. Some of the significant challenges of
blockchain are as follows.
4.1 Security and Privacy
For any blockchain, a key evaluation parameter is how well the security and privacy conditions
meet the requirement of the blockchain. Analyzing the security and privacy issues of blockchain
is a broad research area, and some studies have been conducted in this area. Here we do not
cover those details, instead we only define these terms. Security is defined as three components:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In a generic context, (i) confidentiality is a set of rules
that limits access to information, (ii) integrity is the assurance that the information is trust-
worthy and accurate, and (iii) availability is a guarantee of reliable access to the information
by authorized people. However, in case of blockchain, the term Information used in the above
context can have multiple meanings such as data in the database, smart contract data or trans-
actions. Privacy can be defined as data privacy and user privacy (anonymity). Table 4 includes
some cryptographic mechanisms for achieving security and privacy of information subjected to
different blockchain layers.
In the light of recent increased number of incidents with the security of the different layers
of blockchain platforms and the theft of millions of dollars worth cryptocurrencies, we formulate
the following research problem.
Research Problem 2 Construct a penetration testing tool irrespective of the blockchain plat-
form to test the security and privacy requirements for each layer of any blockchain platform.
4.2 Scalability Issues
The size4 of blockchain is continuously growing, and scalability is becoming a big problem in the
blockchain domain. Scalability depends on the underlying consensus, network synchronization
and architecture. To scale the blockchain, the computational power and the bandwidth capa-
bilities should be high for each node in the blockchain, which is practically infeasible. Most of
the current blockchains grant limited scalability.
One proposal how to address the scalability problems of the blockchain ledger is so called:
”SPV, Simplified Payment Verification” [67]. It verifies if particular transactions are valid but
without downloading the entire ledger. This method is used by some wallet and lightweight
Bitcoin clients, and its security was first analyzed in [68]. Another proposal to achieve high
scalability is to use erasure codes in blockchain by encoding validated blocks into small number
of coded blocks. A recent work [69] proposes the use of fountain codes (a class of erasure codes)
to reduce the storage cost of blockchain by the order of magnitude and hence achieving high
scalability. Applying other types of erasure codes for distributed storage, such as regenerating
codes [70, 71], locally repairable codes [72, 73] or a combination of both types of codes [74, 75],
may reduce even further the storage and communication costs.
Another issue in connection with the scalability is the issue of the interoperability. Namely,
it is a fact that the number of different public ledgers is increasing rapidly. While some sort of a
4https://bitinfocharts.com gives most of the statistics (including size) of popular cryptocurrencies.
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rudimentary interoperability has been implemented in cryptocurrencies exchange platforms [76],
the risks and insecurities with these platforms are vast and well documented [77].
Research Problem 3 Construct a new blockchain mechanism that periodically prunes its dis-
tributed ledger (reduces its size), producing a fresh but equivalent ledger, while provably keeping
correct state of all assets that are subject of the ledger transactions.
Research Problem 4 Construct secure protocols for blockchain interoperability.
A recent reference [78] strongly supports our research problem 3 since it admits that Ethereum
blockchain is almost full now and hence the scalability is a big bottleneck.
4.3 Forking
A blockchain fork is essentially caused when two miners find a block at almost the same time
due to a software update or versioning. In a blockchain network, each device or computer is
considered as ”a full node” which runs software to keep the blockchain secure by verifying the
ledger. The software is updated to adjust some parameters and to install new features in the
blockchain. This updated software may not be compatible with the old software. Consequently,
the old nodes which have not updated their software and the new nodes which have performed
a software update can cause a fork in the blockchain when they create new blocks. There are
two types of forks: one which is not compatible with previous software version, called a hard
fork, and another one which is compatible with the previous version (backward-compatible),
called a soft fork. A hard fork happens when there is a significant change in the software such
as change of block parameters or change of consensus mechanism. In the case of Ethereum, a
hard fork will occur when it will migrate from Proof of Work to Proof of Stake. One example
of a soft fork is Segregated Witness (SegWit) which was implemented in Bitcoin by changing
the transaction format. Recently, privacy coin Beam [79] (an implementation of Mimblewimble
privacy protocol) conducted its first hard fork away from ASICS. Figure 4 depicts a blockchain
forking scenario where the correct chain can be any of these two forked chains depending on the
case of the hard or soft fork.
Research Problem 5 Construct Forking-free consensus mechanism for permissionless public
blockchain.
4.4 Throughput
It is a measure of the number of blocks appended in blockchain per second which effectively
means the number of transactions processed per second. Throughput depends on many factors
such as underlying consensus algorithm, number of nodes participating in consensus, network
structure, node behavior, block parameters and the complexity of the contract (in case of smart
contract supported blockchains). The complexity of a smart contract depends on whether the
programming language of the blockchain is turing-complete or not. However, regarding turing-
completeness of blockchains [80], there is always a division between the blockchain community.
Considering these primary factors, attaining high throughput is a bit hard in blockchain. How-
ever, to achieve high throughput, the size of the transaction can be reduced by excluding some
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Figure 4: Blockchain forking.
information from the transaction. The throughput can be increased by increasing the block size
and the bandwidth of the network till a certain level.
The number of transactions per second was recognized as a serious problem in Bitcoin net-
work. While in the peak holiday period Visa and MasterCard can handle up to 50,000 transac-
tions per second worldwide, the Bitcoin network can handle just 7 transactions. One proposal
how to address this scalability issue is the ”The Bitcoin Lightning Network” [81]. It is a network
that handles instantly the Bitcoin transactions off the main ledger. It establishes a network of
micropayment channels that addresses the malleability by using Bitcoin multi-signatures 2-of-2.
Special nodes are needed for these micropayment networks and as of June 2019, there were
around 4,500 nodes. The first financial transaction via the Lightning network was reported in
January 2018. Litecoin decided to follow the Bitcoin Lightning network, and as of March 2019
there were more than 1000 registered nodes that handle the micropayments for that alternative
cryptocurrency. Many other solutions were proposed to solve the scalability issue, similar to the
Lightning off-chain computation and off-chain state channels, such as Sharding [82], Plasma [83],
Liquid [84] and the recent Channel Factories [85].
As the Lightning network is gaining in popularity, new research challenges emerge as depicted
in [86], and here we rephrase one of their research challenges:
Research Problem 6 ( [86]) Develop scalable protocols that will perform multi-hop payment-
channel and path-based transactions with strong privacy guarantees even against an adversary
that has network-level control.
Addressing Problem 6, many works have been done in the past but all those works are mostly
compatible with Bitcoin or Ethereum blockchain. Recent works [87, 88] on multi-hop payment
channel provide value privacy and security but only for Bitcoin-compatible blockchains. Instead
of supporting only payments like Lightning network, there are off-chain state channels, like Celer
Network [89], which support general state updates while providing significant improvement in
terms of cost and finality.
Research Problem 7 Develop fully functional state channel with strong security and privacy
guarantee.
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4.5 Energy Consumption
The mining process of blockchain (e.g., bitcoin mining) consumes a lot of energy. Most of
the PoW puzzle based consensus protocols waste a huge amount of energy5. Many alternative
consensus algorithms are introduced which use less energy than Bitcoin’s PoW such as Proof
of Stake [45], Equihash [46], and PBFT [47]. Energy is also consumed during communication
over the network. Some cryptographic mechanisms also consume high energy so the selection of
a proper cryptographic mechanism should be based not only on the memory requirement and
the computational load but also on the amount of energy consumption. The use of blockchain
should be energy efficient and to fulfill that 1) PoS-like consensus should be used and 2) proper
energy management techniques should be utilized, for example in the case of Internet-of-Things
(IoT).
4.6 Infrastructure Dependencies
The blockchain infrastructure is built with several elements of network protocols, cryptographic
concepts, and mining hardware. All these elements depend on each other in some sense. If we
look into the layered architecture of blockchain in Table 4, each layer is dependent on its upper
and lower layers for some input/output. Thus, there are many infrastructure dependencies in
blockchain. For instance, the data from the smart contract layer is an input to the transaction
layer that outputs actual transactions; the data from the consensus layer results in an input
to the network layer through a communication protocol; and the data from the network layer
data is sent to the database through database storage management. These dependencies must
be taken into account while building a comprehensive blockchain framework for any use case;
otherwise, some of the blockchain functionalities will not be fulfilled.
From the blockchain infrastructure perspective, we have to mention here one evolving and
enabling technology that will be very important in the next decade: 5G. 5G will connect hun-
dreds of billions of IoT devices, but that vast number of devices can be governed securely only by
strong decentralized mechanisms offered by the blockchain technologies [90, 91]. We formulate
this debate as the following.
Research Problem 8 Construct efficient, scalable, inexpensive and sustainable blockchain sys-
tems capable to handle and securely manage up to billions of IoT devices connected via the 5G
network infrastructure.
5 Overview of used cryptographic concepts in blockchain
From the cryptographic point of view, many of the cryptographic techniques have already been
exhibited and heavily employed in various blockchain platforms and blockchain use-cases [17].
As the spectrum of the cryptographic concepts is vast, there is always a scope to dig out some
of the existing cryptographic schemes and use them in blockchain services.
In Table 5 we give a comprehensive summary of all cryptographic concepts that we will cover
in this and in the next Section. It serves as a handy overview and quick reference table for our
systematization of the cryptographic knowledge used in blockchain.
5https://digiconomist.net/bitcoin-energy-consumption depicts Bitcoin energy consumption index charts
in TWh per year. It also shows the energy consumption per country.
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Following are some of the cryptographic concepts which have already been well analyzed and
implemented in blockchain.
Cryptographic Concept Properties Instantiation (Reference)
Access Control Data privacy Hyperledger Fabric [62], FairAccess [92], [93]
Accumulator Provides Membership Proofs, Anonymity Batching Techniques for Accumulators in Blockchain [94]
Aggregate Signature Fast Signature Verification Tested in Bitcoin [95]
Commitment Scheme Non-Repudiation Used in Bullteproof [96] and in Monero [58,65]
Decentralised Authorization Data Privacy BlendCAC [97], WAVE [98]
Encryption Scheme Confidentiality and Anonymity Kadena [99], Hyperledger Fabric [62], Tendermint [36]
Identity Based Encryption No Public Key Distribution Infrastructure BAVP [100], BLIC [101]
Incremental Cryptography Efficiency Improvement Kadena [99]
Lightweight Cryptography Fast, less Memory/Energy Consumption LSB [102], EVCE [103]
Obfuscation Privacy Tested in Bitcoin [104]
Oblivious RAM Confidentiality and Integrity Solidus [105], EVORAM [106]
Oblivious Transfer Data Privacy Searchain [107], [108]
Post-Quantum Cryptography Quantum Resistant Post-Quantum Blockchain [109], [110], [111]
Private Information Retrieval Data Privacy Private Blockchain Queries from PIR [86]
Proof of Retrievability Cloud Data Recovery Permacoin [112], Retricoin [113], Storj [114]
Secret Sharing Data privacy SHARVOT [115], Wanchain [116]
Secure Multiparty Computation Privacy of Peers and Smart Contract Enigma [117], Hawk [118], Wanchain [116]
Signature Scheme Integrity and Authentication In Every Blockchain e.g. Multichain [64], CryptoNote [119]
Verifiable Delay Function Less Parallelism, Fast Verification Chia Network [120]
Verifiable Random Function Verifiable Pseudorandom Output Algorand [37], Ouroboros Praos [121], Dfinity [122]
White-Box Cryptography Data Privacy Runtime Self-Protection in Blockchain Ledger [123]
Zero-Knowledge Proof User and Data privacy Zerocoin [124], Zerocash [57]
Table 5: Summary of Cryptographic Concepts in Blockchain.
5.1 Signature Scheme
A standard digital signature is a mathematical scheme based on public-key cryptography that
aims to produce short codes called signatures of digital messages by the use of a private key, and
where those signatures are verifiable by the use of the corresponding public key. In this context,
digital signatures guard against tampering and forgeries in digital messages.
A signature scheme is used in blockchain to sign the transaction, hence, authenticating the
intended sender and providing transaction integrity as well as non-repudiation of the sender.
Many of the signature schemes are widely accepted to employ integrity and anonymity in
blockchain. The digital signature is one of the most important cryptographic primitives that
makes blockchain to be publicly verifiable and with achievable consensus. Signature schemes are
used in almost every blockchain. Figure 5 represents a general example about how a blockchain
user (signer) creates a digitally signed transaction or block using his private key. Moreover,
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Figure 6: Verification of digitally signed transaction/block
figure 6 shows how other blockchain nodes (verifier) verify whether the signature on the transac-
tion or block is valid or not using the signer’s public key. Blockchain applies different signature
schemes to provide additional features like privacy, anonymity, and unlinkability. Signature
scheme can also be applied to generate constant size signature using signature aggregation.
Schnorr Signatures are a form of signature aggregation and it has been used in Bitcoin instead
of P2SH [125] for scalability [126]. Some of the signature schemes applied in blockchain are:
1. Multi-Signature: In a multi-signature scheme, a group of users signs a single message. In a
blockchain network, when a transaction requires a signature from a group of participants,
it might be advantageous to use a multi-signature scheme. Blockchain platforms such
as Openchain [127] and MultiChain [64] support M−of−N multi-signature scheme which
reduces the risk of theft by tolerating compromise of up to M -1 cryptographic keys. Boneh
et al. also designed compact multi-signatures for smaller blockchains [128].
2. Blind Signature: In this scheme [129], signatures are employed in privacy-related protocols
where the signer and the message authors (transaction in case of blockchain) are different
parties. Blind signatures are used to provide unlinkability and anonymity of the trans-
action. In a blockchain setup, a blind signature might be helpful to provide anonymity
and unlinkability where the transacting party and the signing party are different. Blind
signatures have been used in BlindCoin [130] distributed mixing network to provide the
unlinkability of transactions. Blind signatures are also tested in Bitcoin to provide the
anonymity for the Bitcoin on-chain and off-chain transactions [131].
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3. Ring Signature: This scheme [132] uses a protocol where a signature is created on a
message by any member of a group on behalf of the group while preserving the identity
of the individual signer of the signature. Ring signatures are used to achieve anonymity
of the signing party in the blockchain network. CryptoNote [119] technology uses a ring
signature scheme to create untraceable payments in the cryptocurrencies. A trustless
tumbling platform [133] also uses ring signature for anonymity.
4. Threshold Signature: This signature scheme is a (t, n) threshold signature where n parties
receive a share of the secret key to create the signature and t out of n parties create a signa-
ture over any message. As the parties directly construct the signature from the shares, the
key is never revealed in the entire scheme. Threshold signature can be helpful to provide
anonymity in the blockchain network. CoinParty [134] uses a threshold signature scheme
for multi-party mixing of Bitcoins. A recent work about coin mixer, ShareLock [135], uses
threshold ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm [136]) to provide privacy-
enhancing solution for cryptocurrencies. However threshold ECDSA signatures are com-
plex due to the intricacies of the signing algorithm. Other signature schemes, such as Ed-
DSA (Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm [137]) using the Edwards25519 curve,
are efficient threshold signatures. Libra [43] blockchain applies this EdDSA during new
account address generation.
While digital signatures produced with the keys used in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are
well legally regulated and can be used in different types of legal disputes, it is a big challenge how
to achieve similar regulations with all types of digital signatures used in the existing blockchain
solutions. Additionally, in the physical world if an asset is stolen (for example an expensive car,
or an expensive watch), it can be traced back to its legal owner.
Research Problem 9 Develop security protocols that merge the existing standardized and le-
galized PKI systems with some of the the developed blockchain systems.
Research Problem 10 Design an anti-theft blockchain system, i.e., a system that guarantees
a return of stolen assets back to their legitimate owners.
Regarding Research Problem 10, recently the Vault proposal was re-launched. Its purpose
is to shield the bitcoin wallet from theft without the need for hard forking [138]. However, for
other blockchain systems, no such proposal or solution exists.
5.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In Zero-knowledge proofs [139], two parties, a prover and a verifier, participate. First, the prover
asserts some statement and proves its validity to the verifier without revealing any other infor-
mation except the statement. Thus, a zero-knowledge proof proves the statement as ‘transfer
of an asset is valid’ without revealing anything about the asset. Zero-knowledge protocols are
extremely useful cryptographic protocols for achieving secrecy in the applications. They can
be used to provide the confidentiality of an asset (transaction data) in the blockchain while
keeping the asset in the blockchain. Some of the public blockchains use zero-knowledge proofs
such as Zerocoin [124] or Zerocash [57] for untraceable and unlinkable transactions. Zerocoin is
a decentralized mix and extension to Bitcoin for providing anonymity and unlinkability of trans-
actions by applying zero-knowledge proofs. In Zerocoin protocol, a user who has Bitcoins can
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generate an equal value of Zerocoins without the need of any third party mixing set. A user can
spend his/her Bitcoin by 1) producing a secure commitment (i.e., Zerocoin), 2) recording it in
the blockchain, and 3) broadcasting a transaction and a zero-knowledge proof for the respective
Zerocoin. Hence, other users can validate the Zerocoin recorded in the blockchain and verify the
transaction along with the proof. Here zero-knowledge proof protects the linking of Zerocoin to
a user, yet Zerocoin is a costly protocol due to its high complexity and large proof size.
Prover Verifier
PProver has a statement which he wants to prove to verifier
Compute a proof for
the statement Send the proof to verifier
Choose a question
Send the question to prover
Calculate the answer
for the question Send the answer to verifier
By using the answer, check 
whether Prover really knows
the statement
Witness Phase
Challenge Phase
Response Phase
Figure 7: An interactive zero-knowledge protocol.
To reduce the complexity and the proof size, a variant of zero-knowledge proof known as
Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) [140] is used
by Zerocash protocol. zk-SNARK hides the information about the amount and the receiver
address in a transaction. The main idea of zk-SNARK is ‘any computational condition can be
represented by an arithmetic circuit, which takes some data as input and gives true or false
in response’. zk-SNARK reduces the proof size and the computational effort compared to the
basic zero-knowledge proofs. An enterprise-focused version of Ethereum, Quorum blockchain
platform [141] also uses zk-SNARK for transaction privacy and anonymity. Figure 7 illustrates
an interactive protocol of zero-knowledge where the prover has a statement, and he/she wants to
prove that the statement is correct without revealing any information related to the statement.
In the interactive protocol, the verifier asks many questions related to the statement and the
prover answers these questions in such a way where the prover proves the statement and does
not reveal any necessary information.
5.3 Access Control
It is a selective restriction on information or resource based on some policy or criteria. These
mechanisms [142] can be enforced to put a restriction or access in the blockchain. The access
can be a read/write access or an access to participate in a blockchain protocol. There are many
different access control mechanisms such as role-based, attribute-based, organizational-based
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access control which can be used in blockchain. Recent incidents show security breaches and data
theft from certain blockchain platforms, which can be tackled and prevented by access control.
The privacy of data can be ensured in blockchains by using access control [92, 93]. Nowadays,
access control techniques are profoundly used in blockchain based medical applications [143]
or blockchains for the insurance industry where the data is sensitive information that must be
accessible to only trusted and authorized parties. There are different types of access control
mechanisms which can be utilized in blockchain applications; some of these mechanisms are
explained to be used in the blockchain.
1. Role-based Access Control (RBAC): RBAC is an approach for restricting the system view
to the users of the system according to their roles in the system. Thus, it can be applied
in a blockchain framework where access is provided according to the user roles. RBAC is
used in a blockchain based solution for Healthcare [144]. A simple example depicted in
Figure 8 describes the role-based access control in a private healthcare blockchain. Based
on the role, each entity in the blockchain system has its own access rights. A Patient can
ask for his personal medical data, however only the Doctor associated with the patient
can enter or modify the patient’s health record in the blockchain. A Research Company
on the other hand can ask for patients’ data for any disease for research purpose.
Healthcare Blockchain
Patient Doctor Research Company
View 
his 
health 
data
Enter /
Edit 
patient
data
View health 
data of patients
for a particular
disease
Figure 8: Role-based access control in healthcare blockchain
2. Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC): In ABAC, the access control rules are based on
the attribute structure. These attributes can be user specific, environment-specific or ob-
ject specific. For example, in a blockchain setup for the insurance industry, ’department’
could be an attribute through which the access of the blockchain data is restricted, which
means the claims handling department would have a different view of the blockchain com-
pared to the audit department. ABAC can be used in a fair access blockchain model [92]
by keeping attributes in policy.
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3. Organization-based Access Control (OrBAC): OrBAC is one of the richest access control
models. OrBAC consists of three entities (subject, action, object) which define that some
subject has the permission to realize some action on some object. OrBAC has already
been used in blockchain for IoT in a fair access blockchain model [92] and in dynamic
access control model on blockchain [145].
Other access control mechanisms such as context-based access control and capability-based ac-
cess control (proposed in blockchain solutions for autonomous vehicles, smart cities, IoT [146])
can also be useful for different blockchain solutions.
5.4 Encryption Scheme
It is a process of encoding a piece of information by which only authorized parties can access it.
It can be used to achieve confidentiality of blockchain data by encrypting it. There are many
encryption schemes which can be used in blockchain. Symmetric-key Encryption is used in Hy-
perledger fabric for confidentiality of smart contract [62] and Blockchain for Smart Home [147].
Although searching and computation over an encrypted data is a big challenge, there are many
existing techniques which can be used for that purpose. Some of these techniques such as search-
able encryption for searching on encrypted data in the cloud is already used in permissioned
blockchain [148], and for computation over encrypted data, fully-homomorphic encryption and
functional encryption can also be utilized in blockchain. Monero cryptocurrency [58] uses (half)
additive homomorphic encryption together with range proof techniques, yet supporting only
value transactions.
In order to assure simultaneously confidentiality and authenticity of data, an authenticated
encryption can be used in blockchain. In authenticated encryption, two peers establish a con-
nection, they both share their public keys and compute the shared secret which is used as the
symmetric key for the authenticated encryption algorithm. The recently finished cryptographic
competition CAESAR [149] has identified a portfolio of six ciphers for authenticated encryption.
So far, as of this writing (June 2019), none of those ciphers has been deployed in some blockchain
system.
Broadcast encryption can be used in blockchain to provide the anonymity of blockchain
receiver nodes. [150] gives a proposal to use for Availability and Accountability for IoT by
blockchain. It has as every user in the group receives the encrypted message, although only
users with the correct permission or key can decrypt it.
5.5 Secure Multi-party Computation (SMPC)
Secure Multi-party Computation enables parties to act together in a way that no single party
has an access to all of the data, and hence no one can leak any secret information. The main
idea of SMPC scheme is to jointly compute a function by parties over their inputs without
disclosing their inputs. For example, a group of people can compute the average salary of the
group without disclosing their actual individual salaries. The blockchain platform Enigma [117]
leverages the concept of SMPC to achieve strong privacy. In Enigma platform, a blockchain
network is combined with SMPC network, where the blockchain network contains the hashes and
SMPC network contains the data corresponding to those hashes which split is among different
nodes. For each node, the view over SMPC network differs as everyone has a different piece of
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information. Specifically, each node contains a random piece of data, and no single party ever
has access to the entire data.
A blockchain model Hawk [118] for privacy-preserving smart contracts also specifies the use
of SMPC to minimize the trust in the generation of common reference string in SNARK proof
used in the model. SMPC can also be exercised for private data storage in a decentralized
system, such as Keep [151]. Keep provides a privacy-focused storage solution for Ethereum. In
this system, network nodes collaborate to provide secure decentralized data containers, called
keeps, which can be accessed from smart contracts on Ethereum.
Ethereum Blockchain  
Wanchain Blockchain  
User A
User B
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WETH
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Nodes
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Figure 9: Cross-Chain transfer mechanism of blockchain using SMPC
An application of SMPC can also be seen in the Wanchain [116] Cross-Chain network.
Figure 9 reflects the SMPC idea in cross-chain transfer model. In Wanchain network, if user
A wants to send an asset (say ETH) from one blockchain (say Ethereum blockchain) to user
B on Wanchain blockchain, then at first the asset value is locked in an account on its original
chain using smart contract. This locked account holds control of the funds. The equivalent
token WETH is sent to another user B of the Wanchain network. When user B wants to convert
its WETH to ETH, the locked amount is released from the locked account and sent to user B,
and the equivalent portion of WETH is burned. These locking and unlocking of asset value
(ETH) happen using SMPC. Wanchain has a concept of Storeman nodes which work together
and perform locking and unlocking of account. These Storeman nodes jointly work together to
create public and private key pair of the related locked account. This shared account private key
is scattered among the Storeman nodes as pieces of the key. To unlock the account, M out of
N (M ≤ N) Storeman nodes contribute their shares of the private key to generate the signature
using MPC jointly.
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5.6 Secret Sharing
In this concept, a secret is divided into multiple parts among the participants, and it is re-
constructed by using a minimum number of parts. These parts are called shares and they are
unique for each participant. Secret sharing is used to secure sensitive information. Secret shar-
ing scheme is advantageous in SMPC for distributing the shares among parties. Shamir’s secret
sharing [152] is already being used to distribute transaction data, without a significant loss in
data integrity in blockchain [153]. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) can take
advantage of secret sharing by distributing the shares of information among the system nodes
rather than storing full information in each node. Secret sharing in DAO can be practiced in
consensus where each participating node stores a set of shares of the system state rather than
storing full system state. These shares are points on polynomials which make up part of the
state.
Secret Sharing
Figure 10: Secret-Sharing-Scheme 2-of-3 for a cryptocurrency wallet private key
Secret sharing schemes are also used in different off-chain and on-chain bitcoin wallets to
safeguard the private keys of the crypto holders. For example, suppose an organization wants
to store its bitcoin with a single master private key. In that case, secret sharing scheme helps
to store the same key among multiple people. A simple example of this scenario will be sharing
a bitcoin wallet key among three people by distributing the shares of the key. These individual
shares do not convey any information about the actual key. However, any 2 of 3 people can
reconstruct the key using their shares as presented in Figure 10. Secret sharing schemes can
benefit blockchain by storing secret information in a decentralized way so that unauthorized
parties cannot access it. Secret sharing is used in blockchain for different purposes such as
secret share-based fair and secure voting protocol (SHARVOT) [115] and new cryptocurrency
based on mini blockchain [154].
5.7 Commitment Scheme
A commitment scheme is a digital analog of a sealed envelop. It is a two-phase game between
two parties where the phases are commit and open. Commit phase involves hiding and binding
of a secret by the first party and send it to the second party; while open is to prove that the first
party did not cheat the second party in the commit phase. Therefore, a commitment scheme
satisfies the aforementioned two security properties: hiding and binding. Hiding ensures that the
receiver cannot see the message before the open phase, while binding ensures that the sender
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cannot change the message after the commit phase. The following example shows a binding
commitment:
1. Pick a secret value s to commit from 0 to p− 1 where p is a large prime number;
2. Calculate the value c = gs mod p;
3. Publish the value c as a commitment.
In the above example, the binding property follows as it is infeasible for the sender to find any
other value y which gives the same c. Here finding the value s from known c, p and g is a
computationally hard problem of discrete logarithm but any party can verify the commitment
value c if s is provided. There are many commitment schemes such as Pedersen commitment [155]
and elliptic curve Pedersen commitment. Zerocoin [124] uses Pedersen commitment to bind a
serial number s to Zerocoin z. The commitment c is given as follows:
c = gshz mod p.
Here g, h, and p are known to everyone, and the user chooses s, z and computes and pub-
lishes the commitment c. These s, z cannot be computed from c even if one is provided. As a
consequence, in Zerocoin when the serial number s is published, the user can prove his/her own-
ership by providing z. Pedersen commitment has also been used to build blockchain-oriented
range proof system, Bulletproof [96] and its elliptic curve version is also successfully imple-
mented in Monero [65]. A switch commitment scheme is designed for confidential transactions
in blockchain [156].
5.8 Accumulator
An accumulator is a one-way function which gives a membership proof without revealing individ-
ual identity in the underlying set. This can be used in blockchain to build other cryptographic
primitives such as commitment, ring signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs. Merkle tree, used
in many cryptocurrencies, fits under a more comprehensive class of cryptographic accumulators
which is space and time efficient data structure to test for set membership. Figure 11 shows how
blockchain transactions are represented in the Merkle tree, and the Merkle root is stored in the
block structure of the blockchain. Non-Merkle accumulators are classified as RSA accumulators
and elliptic curve accumulators.
In Zerocoin [124], an accumulator A is computed by the network overall coin commitments
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) along with the appropriate membership witnesses for each item in the set. The
witness w is computed by the accumulation coins with the exception of one. In this way, during
Zerocoin spend transaction, a user proves the knowledge of one coin by using that witness.
This witness w and accumulator A are publicly verifiable without any trusted third party.
Accumulator A in Zerocoin is defined as:
A = uc1 c2 c3 ... c ... cn mod N,
where the integers A, u and N are known to everyone.The coin c is a Pedersen commitment of
a coin serial number s and the random number z. Zerocoin uses Random Number Generator
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Figure 11: Merkle tree of blockchain transactions.
(RNG) to generate different s and z to find c using Pedersen commitment until c is prime. The
witness w of a coin c is defined as the accumulation of all coins with the exception of c:
A = uc1 c2 c3 ... cn mod N.
Accumulators can also be employed for range proofs in blockchain. Accumulators are used
in [94] to design a stateless blockchain where in order to participate in consensus, the node only
needs a constant amount of storage.
5.9 Oblivious Transfer (OT)
Oblivious Transfer is a two-party protocol between a sender S and a receiver R. The general
type of oblivious transfer is k-out-of-n oblivious transfer
(
n
k
)
-OT , where k < n, in which S holds
n messages and R retrieves simultaneously k of them without letting S know about which k
out of n messages R received. Oblivious transfer is introduced by Rabin [157] in which a sender
sends a message to a receiver with probability 12 . The protocol is called as
1
2 -OT , and it is as
following:
1. Sender S chooses two large primes p, q and computes N = pq and then the sender generates
RSA public key (e,N) such that e is relatively prime to (p− 1)(q − 1).
2. S computes cipher text c over message M as c = E(e,N)(M) = M
e mod N and sends
e,N, c to receiver R.
3. R chooses a random x ∈ ZN∗ and sends a = x2 mod N to S.
4. S computes four square roots of a mod N and chooses one of the roots y at random and
sends it to R.
5. R checks whether y2 ≡ a mod N and if y 6≡ ±x mod N , then R will be able to factor N
and, hence, be able to decrypt c to recover M .
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1
2 -OT is complete for secure multi-party computation. Oblivious transfer has been re-
alized in secure multiparty computation to create private and verifiable smart contracts on
blockchain [158]. Oblivious transfer can also be utilized for exchange of secrets, private infor-
mation retrieval, and building protocols for signing contracts. There has been loads of work
done in oblivious transfer, and some of these works have been applied in blockchains such as
Searchain [107] and APDB [108] (for automated penalization of data breaches using crypto-
augmented smart contracts).
5.10 Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
Oblivious RAM is a cryptographic protocol through which a client can safely store his/her
data in an untrusted server. The client performs read and write operations remotely. ORAM
hides the memory access pattern from the server as well as from outside entities accessing to
that part of the data. Therefore, if a client performs two operations of equal length, then the
polynomial-bounded adversarial server cannot distinguish between these operations. ORAM
bestows freshness, confidentiality of data and integrity so it can be used in various blockchain
use-cases and applications. Solidus [105], a protocol for confidential transactions on public
blockchain, uses oblivious RAM. Solidus framework operates on a modest number of banks
where each bank maintains a large number of user accounts. Solidus introduces a new primitive
called Publicly Verifiable Oblivious RAM Machine (PVORM). Most of the previous usage of
Oblivious RAM is performed by a single client to outsource storage. In Solidus, ORAM is
used to store user account balances and uses PVORM to verify the valid transaction set of
a bank. Oblivious RAM is also used in the client-server ORAM protocol [106], Externally
Verifiable Oblivious RAM, where Ethereum’s automated crypto-currency contracts adjudicate
the disputes occurred due to the malicious server by penalizing the server.
5.11 Proof of Retrievability (POR)
With the advent of cloud computing, a client might outsource his/her data to the cloud, but
still, the client needs a guarantee that the old data has not been modified or deleted. This can
be achieved by using proof of retrievability [159] which is an interactive mechanism between a
client (verifier) and a server (prover) where the server provides a compact proof to the client that
his/her data is intact and he/she can recover the data at any point of time. In this direction, to
verify the proof, the client should be equipped with devices having some computational power
and network access. This requirement hinders the large-scale adoption of POR by cloud users.
To solve this issue, outsource proof of retrievability (OPOR) [160] is introduced where external
auditors verify the POR with the cloud provider on behalf of the clients. OPOR protocol
specification uses Bitcoin functionalities for the building blocks.
Permacoin [112] uses proof of retrievability. The primary goal of Permacoin is the dis-
tributed storage of archival data. As in Bitcoin’s mining mechanism, the client continuously
invests his/her computational power, and in addition to the computational power, his/her stor-
age is invested. As a consequence, Permacoin requires storage overhead and high bandwidth
consumption. To solve these issues, Retricoin [113] is proposed to repurpose the mining work
in order to ensure the retrievability of a large file at any point of time. Retricoin also proposes
a new algorithm for miners to mine collectively. Storj [114] also uses POR to prove the exis-
tence of a fresh copy of a shard on the storer side. As a result, POR can be employed in many
cryptocurrencies and blockchain applications.
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5.12 Post-Quantum Cryptography
Recent advances in quantum computing pose a severe threat to classical cryptography, as most of
the widely used cryptography is based on the hardness of some problem which can be efficiently
solved using quantum computers. Thus, research in the Post-Quantum cryptography [161] has
taken a massive leap. The security impact of breaking public key cryptography by quantum
computers would be tremendous. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which is an approach to
public key cryptography, is mostly used in blockchain applications. Using a variant of Shor’s
algorithm [162], a quantum computer can easily forge an elliptic curve signature that underpins
the security of each transaction in blockchain and so breaking of ECC will affect blockchain in
terms of broken keys, hence, digital signatures.
Research in this field is in the rise to create Post-Quantum resistant digital signatures
(BPQS) [163] which is a hash-based signature and uses one-time signature (OTS) schemes as a
building block. OTS does not depend on any number-theoretic hard problem, and it requires
only a secure cryptographic hash function, hence, it is not vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm. BPQS
has advantages like shorter signatures, faster key generations, and customizable property. Post-
Quantum cryptography is also used to design Post-Quantum blockchain [109] using one-time
signature chains or to create secure crypto-currency based on Post-Quantum blockchain [110].
For the quantum proof solutions, research is now focused on Lattice-based cryptography
[164], multivariate cryptography [165], hash-based cryptography [161], and code-based cryptog-
raphy [166]. Most of the developed primitives within these areas offer either signatures or public
keys that are orders of magnitude bigger than the currently used ones, and that is really a hard
research challenge that we formulate as:
Research Problem 11 Construct a new blockchain mechanism that has comparably efficient
public key addresses and comparably small digital signatures as the currently used ones, but that
is based on Post-Quantum cryptographic schemes.
5.13 Lightweight Cryptography
Conventional cryptographic methods such as RSA and SHA256, work well on systems hav-
ing reasonable memory and processing power, but these methods are not suitable for devices
constrained with memory, physical size, and battery. Conventional cryptographic methods are
challenging to implement in resource-constrained devices due to implementation size, large key
size, throughput, speed, and energy consumption. Nevertheless, to solve these issues, lightweight
cryptography has evolved. Lightweight cryptography targets sensor networks, embedded sys-
tems and other variety of resource-constrained devices such as IoT end nodes and RFID tags.
Lightweight cryptography is simpler and faster than conventional cryptography but less secure
(suffers from many attacks). In IoT, embedded devices having sensors are interconnected through
a public or private network. As these are resource-constrained devices, lightweight cryptography
solves the issues of communication, memory, and power consumption, but still lacks security.
To provide better security, blockchain can be used in conjunction with the sensor network.
Reference [167] reinforces our point to use lightweight cryptography and blockchain for IoT
devices to improve security (confidentiality and integrity of IoT device data). A lightweight
scalable blockchain (LSB) [102] is also introduced to improve IoT security and privacy. LSB uses
a lightweight hash function and lightweight consensus algorithm in order to achieve scalability,
security, and privacy. Blockchain is also used to cater security in electric vehicles, cloud and
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edge computing [103] which use lightweight cryptographic primitives like lightweight symmetric
key encryption.
5.14 Verifiable Random Function (VRF)
This cryptographic primitive [168] is a pseudorandom function which gives a public verifiable
proof of its output based on public input and private key. In short, it maps inputs to verifiable
pseudorandom outputs. VRFs can be used to provide deterministic precommitments which can
be revealed later using proofs. VRFs are resistant to pre-image attacks unlike traditional digital
signature. VRF is a triple of the following algorithms:
• KeyGen(r)→(VK,SK). Key generation algorithm generates verification key VK and secret
key SK on random input r.
• Eval(SK,M)→(O,pi). Evaluation algorithm takes secret key SK and message M as input
and produces pseudorandom output string O and proof pi.
• Verify(VK,M,O,pi)→0/1. Verification algorithm takes input as verification key VK, mes-
sage M, output string O, and proof pi. It outputs 1 if and only if it verifies that O is
the output produced by the evaluation algorithm on input secret key SK and message M,
otherwise it outputs 0.
In context of blockchain, many Proof of Stake blockchains use VRF to perform secret cryp-
tographic sortition such that electing leader and committee as part of underlying consensus pro-
tocol. Proof of Stake blockchain protocols given in [169] use VRF to elect block proposers and
voting committee members. Algorand [37] and Witnet network protocol [170] also employ VRF
to conduct secret cryptographic sortition. Ouroboros Praos [121] uses VRF on current times-
tamp and nonce to determine whether a participant is eligible to issue a block. Dfinity [122]
network is a decentralized cloud computing resource which uses VRF to generate stream of
outputs over time. Thus, the usage of verifiable random function brings many advantages to be
exploited in blockchain and opportunities for more research.
5.15 Obfuscation
Obfuscation is a way of transforming a program P into a ”Black-box” equivalent of the program
Q = O(P ) so that P and Q give the same output when the given inputs are same. It should be
hard to find out the internal logic or structure of the program once it is obfuscated. Obfuscation
aims to make reverse engineering difficult by making the program unintelligible while preserving
its functionality. Finding a perfect black-box obfuscation is mathematically impossible. Along
these lines, a weaker solution is to find an ”Indistinguishability Obfuscation” so that one cannot
determine whether the generated output is from the original program or the obfuscated pro-
gram. A very simplified example for understanding the Indistinguishability Obfuscation, is the
following: There are two equivalent programs P = x ∗ (y + z) and P ′ = x ∗ y + x ∗ z. They are
obfuscated such that we have O(P ) and O′(P ′). We say that the obfuscated programs O and
O′ are indistinguishable if on a received output o one cannot determine which of the programs
O,O′ gave that output.
Obfuscation can be applied for witness encryption, functional encryption, and restricted
use of software. It can be applied in blockchain to turn smart contract into a black-box. An
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obfuscated smart contract can also possess a secret key to decrypt an encrypted input to the
smart contract. As a result, publicly running contracts can possess secret data inside it by
obfuscating the smart contract. Figure 12 depicts an obfuscated smart contract which stores
the private key corresponding to a public key which is used to encrypt the transaction data. It
is hard to get the corresponding private key because of the obfuscated smart contract.
Input Tx Data
ENC DEC
Public key Private key
Actual Tx data
S
Smart
Contract
Process
Output Tx
Obfuscated Smart Contract
Figure 12: An example of smart contract obfuscation.
One of the very first successful attempts to offer a very limited variant of obfuscation in
Bitcoin was the standardization of the ”Pay to script hash (P2SH) transactions” [125]. The
amounts of Bitcoins in P2SH transactions are sent to a script hash instead of a public key hash.
We say that it was a limited variant of obfuscation because in order to spend Bitcoins received
via P2SH, the recipient must provide a script that matches the script hash. Still, the successful
acceptance of the P2SH transactions without causing a hard fork in Bitcoin showed that there
is an interest in obfuscation in Blockchain, and that subject is a viable research area.
Research on obfuscation in Bitcoin [104] has been conducted and can be compiled for other
cryptocurrencies and blockchain applications. Obfuscation is also used in blockchain for power
grid consumption [171] where noise is added to the user’s electricity consumption data through
obfuscation, and the electricity consumption data is divided into random and non-random ob-
fuscated data.
As noted in [172] the definition and characteristics of some languages determine how easy
is to obfuscate programs written in those languages. For example C, C++, Java and Perl
are languages that offer easier program obfuscation. What about scripting languages used in
Blockchain? We reformulate this question as a research problem:
Research Problem 12 Study the easiness/hardness of obfuscating programs written in the
scripting languages used in the current blockchain systems. Study the feasibility of applying some
of the developed obfuscation techniques in C, C++, Java and Perl for the blockchain scripting
languages.
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6 Promising but yet not employed cryptographic primitives in
blockchain
This Section construes some cryptographic concepts which are promising candidates to be uti-
lized in blockchain. These cryptographic concepts are not yet well-studied and fully applied in
blockchain but constitute of some excellent properties which overlap with some desired prop-
erties of blockchain. Therefore, some use cases and blockchain services can benefit from these
concepts. The included concepts in this Section have either not at all been studied for use in
blockchain or have been studied but not implemented yet. We include references which show
some initial ideas how to use these concepts in blockchain, but these references do not give any
details about concrete implementation.
6.1 Aggregate Signature
An aggregate signature allows creating a single compact signature from k signatures on k distinct
messages from k distinct signers. It provides faster verification as well as reduction in storage
and bandwidth. As in blockchain, the requirement of storage and computation is high; aggregate
signatures can be used for reduction in storage and computation. Aggregate signatures are the
non-trivial generalization of multi-signatures (where all users sign the same message). There are
two primary mechanisms of signature aggregation: general and sequential aggregation. In order
to describe these mechanisms, assume a set of k users having public-private key pair (PKi, SKi)
and user i wants to sign message Mi.
1. In general signature aggregation scheme, each user i (from the group of k users) creates
signature σi on his/her message Mi. Now to create aggregate signature, anyone can run
public aggregation algorithm to take all k signatures σ1, σ2, . . . , σk and compress them into
a single signature σ.
2. In sequential signature aggregation scheme, user 1 signs M1 to obtain σ1; user 2 then
combines σ1 and M2 to obtain σ2; and so on. The final signature σ is generated by user
k which binds Mk and the signature σk−1. Sequential signature aggregation can only take
place during the signing process.
Techniques for aggregating signatures are known for a variety of signature schemes such as
DSA, Schnorr, pairing-based, and lattice-based. Aggregate signature schemes should restrict
any adversary from creating a valid aggregate signature on his/her own. Aggregate signatures
have been proposed for Bitcoin [95], and they can be applied to other cryptocurrencies and
blockchain designs.
Research Problem 13 Construct an efficient new signature scheme based on aggregate signa-
tures, that is specifically tailored for blockchain transactions.
6.2 Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
Identity-Based Encryption first proposed as idea in [173] and later realized as complete crypto-
graphic primitive in [174], allows the encrypting party to use any known (or supposedly known)
identity of any receiving party as its public key. Upon receiving the encrypted message, the
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receiving party asks a trusted third party ”Private Key Generator (PKG)” to generate the cor-
responding private key. Then the receiver decrypts the message using the private key received
by PKG. Nowadays, by using identity-based encryption, public keys can be generated using the
social identities (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn).
There are many flavors and extensions of IBE such as Hierarchical IBE [175], Attribute-based
encryption [176], Decentralized attribute-based encryption [177], Functional encryption [178] to
name a few.
One of the specifics of IBE is that it replaced the role of the Public-Key Infrastructure with
the trusted third party PKG. The presence of a trusted third party somehow defeats the purpose
to use it in permissionless blockchain, but still there is a scope to use it in the distributed ledger.
Namely, it seems that IBE can be used in permissioned blockchain network. In permissioned
blockchain a consortium of trusted third parties that distribute the private keys to the users can
take the role to be IBE PKG. Another variant could be a smart contract layer being responsible
for the generation of public-private key pairs inside the PKG using IBE.
We identified that the use of IBE within blockchain has started in [100] as well as in sup-
ply chain management [101].. Still, there are a lot of challenges and opportunities for other
blockchain applications and services.
Research Problem 14 Construct an IBE based (or IBE related) permissioned blockchain net-
work.
6.3 Verifiable Delay Function (VDF)
Verifiable Delay Function (VDF) is a function f : X → Y which takes a prescribed number of
sequential steps to compute; however, the output can be easily verifiable by anyone. This delay
function prevents malicious miners from computing the random output, and it also provides a
short proof which is used during the verification of the output along with previously generated
public parameters. Boneh et al. described the concept of VDF [179] as well as illustrated the
idea about how it can be applicable to blockchain. VDF can be efficiently used as a way to
add a delay in decentralized applications. VDF can be used in the application of decentralized
systems such as in leader election process of consensus mechanisms, constructing randomness
beacons and proofs of replication.
Delay function was initially implemented in Ethereum prototype [180] where the main idea
was verification of delay functions through smart contract by using a multi-round protocol. After
this prototype implementation, the concept of verifiable delay function was proposed by Boneh et
al. Nowadays several blockchain industries are trying to use VDF in their consensus mechanisms.
Chia Network [120] which is open source blockchain is trying to use VDF in its “Proof of space
and time” consensus mechanism. Ethereum is also trying to develop a pseudorandom number
generator using VDF. In this way, VDF brings opportunities to dig deeper and to be applied in
the blockchain domain.
Research Problem 15 ( [181]) Finding a post-quantum secure simple VDF for the use of
blockchain.
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6.4 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
It is a cryptographic primitive in which a client queries to a server and retrieves the corresponding
response from the server without exposing query terms as well as response. It is a weaker version
of 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer. It can facilitate private blockchain queries to fetch transaction
data privately from blockchain. Accordingly, it can be used to find out whether a particular
transaction has been appended in the blockchain or can be used to check the transactions
associated with the set of public keys and find out the remaining balances. In addition, PIR can
be helpful to query transaction data in simplified payment verification (SPV) clients without
compromising privacy. PIR requires an adequate amount of processing, but in the future there
might be efficient PIR techniques which can be implemented in blockchain. PIR has also been
applied in distributed storage [182] which can be further investigated and adopted in blockchain.
Paper [86] sets several research problems in the area of blockchain transactions privacy and
private information retrieval. We rephrase some of the research challenges postulated there:
Research Problem 16 ( [86]) Develop protocols where non-anonymous users can publish trans-
actions that cannot be linked to their network addresses or to their other transactions.
Research Problem 17 ( [86]) Develop protocols where non-anonymous users can fetch de-
tails of specific transactions without revealing which transactions they seek.
Research Problem 18 ( [86]) Develop efficient and scalable protocols for anonymous publish-
ing on permissioned blockchains, by combining the asynchronous Byzantine-tolerant consensus
protocols for agreeing on transactions with the process of mixing users’ announcements.
6.5 Decentralized Authorization
Authorization and/or hiding sensitive data and actions are essential concepts of resource sharing
in open and collaborative environments such as the Internet. Furthermore, in a decentralized
form of authorization, parties have full control over their resources and authority to delegate it
whether entirely or in part to other parties. An authorization system should provide only as
little access to the users as possible to perform their jobs.
Traditional access control is a centralized authorization server which imposes a problem of
single point of failure. The centralized authorization scheme has different methods of authoriza-
tion such as access control list or role-based access.
In comparison, decentralized authorization is more efficient and easier in terms of time,
resource and quality. A decentralized authorization system should be well administrated to give
access privileges to the users. On the negative side, having in mind that the auditing is also a
key component of authorization, in a decentralized manner, it is hard to efficiently implement
it and to enforce it.
By using blockchain smart contract, some decentralized authorization systems have been
designed, e.g., BlendCAC [97] and WAVE [98]. WAVE introduces an authorization layer for
the name spaces and resources. Moreover, for the outside entities, a delegation of trust is used
to obtain permission on a resource. Decentralized authorization and blockchain can be used to
grow each other by combining one another in a specific way.
Research Problem 19 Construct a decentralized authorization protocol for permissioned
blockchain that will provide access privileges as well as a delegation of these access to the users.
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6.6 White-Box Cryptography
White-box attack is a threat model where the attacker has full visibility of the internal data flow
and can modify the data and code. White-box cryptography [183] aims to address the challenge
of implementing a cryptographic algorithm in software in such a way that cryptographic assets
remain secure even when subject to white-box attacks. A white-box cryptographic implemen-
tation must resist black-box (the attacker has access to only input and output of algorithm),
grey-box (side-channel), and also white-box attacks. White-box cryptography is a way to im-
plement cryptographic algorithms like RSA and AES so that the keys remain hidden all the
time even during the execution. In some white-box implementations, the key is baked into the
code and further concealed to use it in a cryptographic algorithm. In blockchain, it can be used
to hide the private key inside the smart contract, and that key can be unlocked when smart
contract executes and further it can be used to create a signature.
White-box cryptography can be orchestrated in blockchain to establish trust and privacy
of assets. As in blockchain, key and seed secrets are a single point of compromise; these are
the highly vulnerable and lucrative targets when stored in memory. To safely store the key,
it can be obfuscated in white-box cryptography and further used for encryption/decryption.
The implementation of white-box cryptography should be strong enough to facilitate the key
storage in blockchain. It has been used in runtime self-protection in a trusted blockchain-inspired
ledger [123] and can be promoted in other blockchain applications and services.
6.7 Incremental Cryptography
The idea behind incremental cryptography [184] is if there is a modification to some document
M to M ′, then the time to update the result upon modification of M should be ”proportional” to
the ”amount of modification” done to M . Incremental cryptography can be used in incremental
collision free-hashing or incremental digital signature. The initial idea proposed for incremental
cryptography uses the example of a digital signature. The idea was to have a digital signature
which is easy to update upon the modification of the underlying message. Suppose M is a
message and σ is the corresponding signature. If M is changed to M ′ by adding/deleting any
block, then the time to update the signature from σ to σ′ should be ”proportional” to the
”amount of modification” done to get M ′ from M .
A proposal for construction of an incremental hash function based on SHA-3 is given in [185],
and a private blockchain ”Kadena” [99] proposes the use of either Merkle tree or incremental
hashing for transaction verification. The concept of incremental hashing in Kadena blockchain
is to update the distributed log among the blockchain nodes.
Research Problem 20 Construct a new blockchain mechanism that uses an incremental hash
function for updates of the distributed ledger.
6.8 Identity-based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE)
IBBE scheme [186] can be considered as a generalization of identity-based encryption scheme
(Section 6.2) where instead of having one receiver, there are multiple receivers. In broadcast
encryption the users are recognized by their identities rather than by their public keys. In a
multi-receiver setting, IBBE proves as a powerful method to provide data security and privacy.
In this scheme, a sender broadcasts the encrypted message to an intended set of users called
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privilege set. There can be many privilege sets with different cardinalities. A revocable IBEE
scheme [187] shows a scenario of IBEE in which the involved players are the key authority,
revoked and non-revoked users. In this setting, the decryption key is updated through the
release of a key update material by the key authority. These decryption keys are updated only
for the non-revoked users. In this scheme, a membership is revoked for a user if he/she is found
malicious or his/her keys are compromised. This RIBBE scheme is further implemented in
Charm framework [188].
As blockchain is a multi-receiver setting, IBBE can be a propitious candidate to provide
transaction data security and privacy. It can also be used in a permissioned blockchain to
certify blocks of membership operation logs. RIBBE scheme as being very efficient in terms
of computational complexity and communication can work efficiently as well in the case of
blockchain.
Research Problem 21 Develop protocols to certify the blocks of membership operation logs in
permissioned blockchain setting.
6.9 Other Techniques:
1. Message Authentication Code (MAC): It is a short piece of information (known as a tag)
to authenticate a message which states that the message comes from the stated sender
and it has not been changed. It can be used in blockchain to provide integrity of smart
contracts or network data. A blockchain-based system for secure mutual authentication
(BSeIn) [189] uses MAC for the authentication.
2. Non-Interactive Witness Indistinguishability (NIWI): These are proof systems which are
weaker variants of Non-Interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs. Witness Indistinguish-
able property states that the verifier cannot distinguish which witness is used to prove
the statement by the prover, considering the case of existence of many witnesses. NIWI
has been used to construct NIZK over POS based blockchain protocol [190] as well as re-
cently, a new construction of publicly verifiable NIWI proofs from blockchain [191] is also
proposed. Hence NIWI proofs bring a new direction to be exploit within the blockchain
domain.
3. Position-based Cryptography : In this cryptographic protocol [192], the identity or the cre-
dentials of a party are derived from his/her geographical location. These credentials can
be further used for position-based secure communication and position-based authentica-
tion. Position-based cryptography has not been applied in blockchain yet, but it looks
promising.
4. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Merkle (ECDHM) addresses: These addresses [193] can
be used to exchange messages privately in the blockchain. It can be used in blockchain
for secure communication among parties. ECDHM address is shared between the sender
and the receiver as secret shares, and they use this shared secret to derive anonymous
transacting addresses of each other. This address may only be exposed once they have the
share to construct these addresses. In this way, it can be used for the privacy of transaction
data.
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5. Verifiable Secret Shuffle: It is a variant of a zero-knowledge proofs (an honest-verifier
zeroknowledge) proposed in [194]. An initial application of verifiable shuffles has been
proposed as a mixing service for Ethereum [195].
7 Conclusion
The goal of this work was to offer a systematic study of available cryptographic concepts and
to identify different research directions and problems. Based on these reviewed concepts and
associated properties, we hope that the paper will help cryptographers interested in blockchain
to choose a challenging research problem and for practitioners to choose a suitable concept for
their particular use case.
Current transitions to blockchain enabled solutions by different industries give rise to more
research on this technology. Academic and industrial research is focused on making blockchain
cost efficient in terms of computational power, memory requirements and security. Many existing
cryptographic concepts have been embraced for blockchain use. This paper systematizes the cur-
rent state-of-the-art knowledge of existing cryptographic concepts used in the blockchain. It also
gives a brief description of the used cryptographic concept and points to the available blockchain
models that are using that concept. The paper also identifies some concepts which have not yet
been used in blockchain but can be beneficial if applied in the blockchain. Apart from existing
cryptographic concepts, the paper also presents the basic building blocks of blockchain and how
these building blocks are dependent on each other.
Table 5 summarizes all of the cryptographic concepts (used or with potentials to be used in
blockchain) presented in this work.
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